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This study contributes new evidence from a unique data set and setting on the usefulness of 
the mandatory “proposed use of proceeds” disclosures in the IPO prospectus, for explaining 
underpricing and post-listing performance. This is the first known study other than Leone, Rock 
and Willenborg (2007) to provide detailed evidence on this issue. The paper also examines 
whether capitalized intangible assets and registered intellectual property (patents, trademarks and 
designs) (IP) are quality signals that help reduce underpricing and provide information about 
future performance. The results from this study indicate that the “use of proceeds” information is 
useful for evaluating the level of underpricing and future operating and market performance. 
Consistent with the theoretical arguments, factors that are important in interpreting the “use of 
proceeds” and the capitalized intangible assets and IP information are whether or not the company 
is in the pre-production or production phase and the amount of information provided that relates to 
the firm’s stock of growth opportunities, concerns relating to free cash flow and corporate 
governance issues, whether the firm has scale economies and how well the firm performed 
historically, and adverse selection issues that lead to investor demand for information about the 
firms’ growth opportunities. The results reveal a number of differences between the “use of 
proceeds”, and their interactions with intangibles and IP, relations with future operating 
performance versus future market performance which suggest this information may not be readily 
interpretable by investors. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper examines the usefulness of mandated disclosures in the initial public offering 
(IPO) prospectus relating to the proposed use of the issue proceeds for evaluating the underpricing 
of the offer and future performance.1 Because information about growth opportunities is important 
in the IPO setting, this “proposed use of proceeds” information is studied in the context of 
accounting information in the prospectus pro forma balance sheet about intangible assets, and the 
extent that the IPO holds registered intellectual property rights over its assets. Disclosure of the 
proposed use(s) of the issue proceeds is mandatory in the IPO prospectus in some jurisdictions. 
These disclosures are reported by insiders and are potentially key information items for evaluating 
the IPO pricing and expected performance in a setting where relevant financial information is 
scarce. Security regulators frequently question companies lodging prospectuses about their 
reliability. The transparency and detail relating to the “use of proceeds” is one area of concern.2 
Despite these compliance and potential value relevance issues, the role of the proposed “use of the 
proceeds” disclosure for evaluating IPO prospects has received limited attention in the literature. 
This paper addresses this gap in the literature. The focus of the paper is the proposed “use 
of the issue proceeds”, which is hand collected data from IPO prospectuses, comprising the 
proposed use, the dollar amount and the total expected proceeds. Eight categories of proposed 
“uses of proceeds” are identified from the prospectus and classified as either pre-production 
                                                          
1 Economic uncertainty and information asymmetry relating to the incentives of management and the firm’s prospects 
are relatively higher on average in the IPO market as the firms going public are typically younger and in earlier life 
cycle compared to their listed counterparts (e.g., Ritter 1999). These uncertainties are reflected in the widely 
documented underpricing of the offer, and declining operating and stock price performance for up to five years after 
the IPO (e.g., Jain and Kini 1994; Loughran and Ritter 1995; Lee, Taylor and Walter 1996; Pagano, Panetta and 
Zingales 1998; Ritter and Welch 2002). Underpricing and underperformance has been associated with factors such as 
the firm characteristics including the market-to-book ratio, age and size (Ritter 1999); information asymmetry (Rock 
1986); and bargaining power (e.g., Fishe 1999; Daniel 2002; Derrien 2006) 
2 For example, Lee, Taylor, Yee and Yee (1993) find management earnings forecasts in prospectus inaccurate, over-
optimistic, and “blamed” on external factors such as competition. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) adopted new plain English disclosure rules effective on October 1, 1998. Further new SEC rules, 
effective from December 2005, have liberalized disclosure procedures but also expand the disclosure required in 
Exchange Act (Form 10-K) reports to encompass risk factors, voluntary filer status, well-known seasoned issuer 
status, and material unresolved SEC staff comments. The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) 
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related expenditures, comprising working capital, R&D, and exploration that relate to growth or 
financing; or production related expenditures that relate to financing, expansion or control 
comprising working capital and investments in securities, capital expenditures, acquisitions, 
repayment of debt and insiders selling shares (cashing out). A ninth factor with potential corporate 
governance issues due to large insider controlling interests is examined. This is the backdoor 
listing phenomenon where an existing company purchases a private company and relists as a new 
company. Because information about the existence and value of growth opportunities is 
particularly important to investors in the IPO setting, two indicators of growth opportunities are 
also examined including recorded intangible assets in the pro forma balance sheet; and the IPO 
firms’ ownership of registered intellectual property at the listing date comprising patents, 
trademarks and designs. This paper extends the IPO literature by exploiting a unique setting in 
which “use of proceeds” disclosures are required in the prospectus under company law and 
intangible assets are commonly reported including acquired goodwill and identifiable intangible 
assets, R&D assets, and internally generated identifiable intangible assets. Further, the fund-raising 
method of “fixed price offers” increases information asymmetry relative to settings adopting other 
selling mechanisms (Lee, Taylor and Walter 1996). The setting therefore provides a strong test for 
the prospectus information due to the absence of other information avenues (e.g., book building 
and “road shows”). 
The results from this study indicate that the “use of proceeds” information is useful for 
evaluating the level of underpricing and future operating and market performance. Consistent with 
the theoretical arguments, factors that are important in interpreting the “use of proceeds” and the 
capitalized intangible assets and IP information are whether or not the company is in the pre-
production or production phase and the amount of information provided that relates to the firm’s 
stock of growth opportunities, concerns relating to free cash flow and corporate governance issues, 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
“consistently identified problems with prospective financial information as a leading cause of ASIC issuing stop 
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whether the firm has scale economies and how well the firm performed historically, and adverse 
selection issues that lead to investor demand for information about the firms’ growth opportunities.  
The results reveal a number of differences between the “use of proceeds” and interactions 
with intangibles and IP associated with future operating performance versus future market 
performance. For example, there is the incremental value relevance of R&D “use of proceeds” 
companies for five years after listing while the R&D “use of proceeds” is not significant in the 
operating performance tests suggesting this group of firms does not perform well on average up to 
seven years after going public. Another example is the purchased goodwill interactions with 
repayment of debt, capital expenditures and insider selling which are all positively and 
significantly associated with market performance. However, none of these interactions are 
associated with the firms’ post-listing operating performances over the same seven year period.  
These differences could be due to omitted correlated variables, or to lead-lag relations 
between operating performance and market value in which expected value is reflected in market 
value before it appears in earnings. Another possibility is that investors do not understand the 
implications of different types of capitalized intangible assets and IP for the operating performance 
of different types of firms. This could be because the value relevant intangibles and IP change over 
time or vary across industries and strategies. Another possibility is that investors do not take into 
account the difference between intangibles and IP that are already mature and generating only a 
normal return and intangibles and IP that have yet to mature and are therefore capable of 
generating rents into the future. 
This study contributes to the IPO literature in several ways. First, using hand-collected data 
from prospectus, this paper contributes new evidence and raises many questions relating to the 
usefulness to investors of mandated information concerning the new issuers’ “use of proceeds” 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
orders since the mid-1990s” (ASIC Draft Policy Statement 170.22 2001). 
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disclosures. Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2007) is the only other known study that examines the 
“use of proceeds” disclosures in the prospectus. This study builds on their work, which focuses on 
the amount of the disclosures rather than the underlying economics as in the current study. Further 
the Leone et al study is set in the US setting where book building is used as opposed to fixed offers 
as in the current setting. Second, this study contributes new evidence to the long-running debate on 
the reliability of recorded intangible assets and the signal conveyed by registered property rights.. 
Recorded intangible assets in prospectus have received limited attention in the United States 
setting due to accounting rules that prohibit the recognition of intangible assets. This censure of 
recorded intangible assets has renewed prominence with the issue of IAS 38 Intangible Assets by 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). IAS 38 takes a strict stance to effectively 
prohibit recording of all but purchased intangible assets. Since the United States Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is committed to the international harmonization of 
accounting standards, the strict stance already adopted by the FASB is destined to continue. There 
is a growing body of literature studying quality weighted IP measures because individual patents, 
trademarks and designs vary widely in value (see Wyatt 2007). Intangibles on the other hand are 
subject to accounting regulations which theoretically should lead to more reliable information. 
However, differences in the investors’ perceptions of the signal conveyed by intangibles compared 
to their relation with operating performance raises questions about the interpretability of 
intangibles under the current regulatory approach. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypothesis 
development; Section 3 provides background on the setting and sample statistics. Section 4 
provides the empirical analyzes and Section 5 concludes the study. 
2.  Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
 7
Figures 1 and 2 provide an overview of the “uses of proceeds” and the theory and 
hypotheses developed in this section. We begin in Section 2.1 with a description of the “proposed 
use of proceeds” from the prospectus. 
2.1  Classification of the “Proposed Use of Proceeds” 
This study is conducted in the Australian setting where the security regulator, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, requires that IPOs disclose their proposed use 
of the issue proceeds in the prospectus including the “use” and the dollar amount proposed to be 
allocated to that “use”. The ASIC requirement stems from the content requirement for 
prospectuses set out in Section 710 of the Corporations Act 2001(Cth). Inadequate disclosure 
relating to the “use of proceeds” has been the subject of ASIC actions (ASIC 2006). The standard 
of disclosure envisaged by the securities regulator is “all information that would enable investors 
and their professional advisers to make an informed assessment of the issuer’s prospects” (Policy 
Statement 170 Prospectus Financial Information, 2002 PS 170.10). Commercial benefits do not 
justify withholding information from investors (Draft Policy Statement: Better Prospectus 
Disclosure, PS No. 66, ASIC 2006, para. 67). An example of inadequate disclosure is designating 
all proceeds are to be used for working capital. 
The IPOs’ proposed “use of the offer proceeds” was manually collected from the 
prospectus including the proposed use of proceeds, the dollar amount allocated to each use, and the 
total expected proceeds. As summarized in Figure 1 and described in Table 1, eight major 
proposed uses for the issue proceeds were identified from the sample firm’s prospectuses (the 
sample is discussed later) including: (1) working capital; (2) investment in securities; (3) R&D 
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investment; (4) exploration; (5) capital expenditures; (6) acquisitions; (7) repayment of debt; and 
(8) founders selling shares.3  













In approximately 25 percent of the prospectuses, extensive reading was required to 
determine the proposed use of the proceeds and amounts allocated to each proposed use. The 
remaining 75 percent of the sample firms’ prospectuses clearly tabulated or discussed the firm’s 
                                                          
3 The seven uses identified by Leone et al (2007) in the US setting include: (1) repay debt; (2) acquisition or 
expansion; (3) advertising, marketing, promotion and sales; (4) working capital; (5) R&D; and (6) selling by pre-IPO 
PRODUCTION  
WORKING CAPITAL   
PRE-
PRODUCTION  
PROPOSED USE OF ISSUE PROCEEDS 
IS GROWTH OR FINANCE 
R&D INVESTMENT 
EXPLORE 
PROPOSED USE OF ISSUE PROCEEDS IS 
EXPANSION, FINANCE OR CONTROL 
WORKING CAPITAL INCLUDING 




CASHOUT -More growth opportunities/more risk 
-Less assets in place 
-Information about growth 
opportunities is important for 
evaluating future performance 
prospects 
--Information asymmetry and adverse 
selection problems 
-Working capital subject to free cash 
flow problem 
-Less growth opportunities/less risk 
-More assets in place 
-Information about growth opportunities is 
important for evaluating future 
performance prospects 
--Information asymmetry and adverse 
selection problems 
-Working capital, repay debt, and cashout 
subject to free cash flow and/or corporate 
governance concerns 
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proposed use of proceeds in the text. Below is an example of the classification of proposed 
expenditures for the Australian Tourism Group. The text is reproduced from the company’s 
prospectus and the right hand column shows the classification.  
PURPOSE OF THE ISSUE 
The purpose of the issue is to raise $50 million in new funds to enable ATF and ATC to: 
* repay bank debt $30.7m REPAY
* develop the existing asset portfolio through addition of   
    Rooms and refurbishment $5.2m WC
* fund the purchase and upgrading of Country Comfort Inn   
    Mudgee (refer Section 11.9) $4.7m CAPEX
* pay final call on partly paid units in Reef Casino Trust due on   
    1 April 1995 (refer Section 6.2) $4.8m WC
* meet issue expenses $3.8m WC
* pay stamp duty on leases $0.8m WC
  $50.0m 
 
For expenditures to be classified as capital expenditures (USE_CAPEX) or acquisitions 
(USE_ACQUIRE), the company must specifically identify the commitment to which the proceeds 
are allocated. Otherwise, the expenditures are classified as working capital. For example, the the 
$5.2 million item in the Australian Tourism Group example is flagged as a capital expenditure but 
there is no firm commitment to a specific capital investment disclosed in the prospectus. Hence, 
the amount is conservatively classified as working capital. This approach implicitly assumes 
unsubstantiated “proposed expenditures” are unreliable which is consistent with the ASIC concern 
with, and evidence documenting, consistent incidences of unsubstantiated disclosures in the 
prospectus.4 Accounting conservatism is also consistent with this coding approach as contingent 
assets cannot be capitalized: i.e., capital expenditures imply the existence of a long lived asset. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
investors; and (7) other. 
4 For example,  http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic_pub.nsf/byheadline/06-
027+ASIC+releases+draft+guidance+on+shorter,+better+prospectuses?openDocument 
ASIC has draft guidelines for issuers and advisers on the preparation of prospectuses. The policy statement also 
provides guidance on specific prospectus content issues including: risk disclosure and the use of proceeds of the 
fundraising. 
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One additional factor which is also examined alongside these proposed uses of proceeds is 
“backdoor” listings. Sixty-two of the 241 in the IPO sample employed in this study involve a new 
core business through a backdoor listing. “Backdoor listing” involves an existing public company 
purchasing a private or public company by issue of shares and options. Relisting of inactive 
mining companies as dot com companies is the most common “backdoor” transaction. Backdoor 
purchase and capital raisings are undertaken in accordance with a prospectus lodged with ASIC 
and ASX. Usually the public listed company is suspended from trading on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) or is inactive at the time of the transaction. Gillespie (2002) provides an example 
of a typical share structure for this type of arrangement as follows.  
Shares Issued  Number of Shares  Capital  
Existing Shares on Issue in Mining 
Ltd  
3,825,000  1,577,500  
Shares issued to buy 'XY dot com' 
Company  
20,000,000  10,000,000  
Shares offered under additional 
Capital Raising Prospectus  
10,000,000  5,000,000  
TOTAL  33,825,000  $16,577,500  
 
Corporate governance issues arise with backdoor listings because the owner and founder of 
the company taken public is usually a significant blockholder in the new IPO company. In 
Gillespie’s (2002) example above, the founder effectively receives the 20 million shares giving the 
founder two-thirds of the company’s shares and complete control over the Board of the new 
company. Gillespie (2002) reports anecdotally that for small cap public companies, the firm value 
decreases for insider blockholdings in excess of 25 percent due to the lack of power of the Board 
to enforce good corporate governance. This form of IPO therefore has characteristics that would be 
expected to impact the level of underpricing of the offer and investor expectations of post-listing 
performance.  
Table 1 summarizes the proposed use of proceeds variables employed in this study.  
PUT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Table 2 Panel B provides summary statistics for the eight uses of proceeds.  
PUT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Only nine IPOs did not nominate any allocation of proceeds to working capital. Consistent 
with the ASIC concerns relating to the transparency and clarity of reporting of the proposed uses 
of proceeds, thirty-seven companies out of the 241 in the sample proposed working capital as the 
primary usage for 100 percent of their issue proceeds. For example, Mobile Communication 
Holdings Limited included the following proposed use for the issue proceeds: 
“Directors intend to utilise the cash in order to pay the costs of the issue, to provide 
working capital for the Company and through it, Mobiletronics, MDT and United 
Telecommunications.” (Section 1 Investment Review). 
Consistent with prior evidence (e.g., Pagano, Panetta and Zingales 1998), 38.6 percent of 
the firms planned to repay debt with the issue proceeds. The maximum dollar amount of debt 
repayment is 96.3 percent of the total issue. Pagano et al (1998) find “debt repayment” issuers are 
mature firms with few apparent growth options. Also consistent with Zingale’s (1995) proposal 
that “going public” is a step in the sale of a company by its initial owner, 21.6 percent of the 
sample firms had vendors selling their shares in the company.5 Four companies had founders 
selling 100 percent of their shares while untabulated statistics show there are 29 companies (12 
percent of the sample) with founders selling 50 percent or more of their shares. In relation to the 
dollar amounts that the IPOs proposed to allocate to the various listing purposes, deflated by the 
total offer amount, working capital has the largest mean and median, 50.7 and 45.1 percent of the 
issue respectively. Allocations to R&D have a mean of 2.7 percent of the total issue and ranging 
from a minimum of zero dollars up to 70 percent of the total issue. The standard deviation of the 
                                                          
5 This is a conservative estimate of cashing out as vendors often timed their sale of shares with the public issue, 
advertised the sale in the prospectus, but apparently managed their sale of founding shares separately from the public 
issue. If these were included the percentage of cashouts would be higher. 
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uses of proceeds relative to the total issue is highest for working capital, cashout, and explore, and 
lowest for R&D reflecting the smaller dollar amounts of the total issue. 
2.2  Pre-Production and Production Related Expenditures 
Figure 1 distinguishes the IPO firms and their proposed use of proceeds on the basis of the 
firm’s investment type, specifically, whether the companies are proposing to use the proceeds for 
pre-production investments (USE_RD or USE_EXPLORE) or financing (USE_WC) or use the 
proceeds for production including expansion (USE_CAPEX, USE_ACQUIRE), financing 
(USE_WC, USE_REPAY) or control transactions (i.e., USE_CASHOUT is the selling of 
founder’s shares).  
The significance of the pre-production/production categorization relates to the distinction 
between growth firms with growth opportunities versus established firms with more assets in place 
and fewer growth opportunities. Firms can increase their assets and earnings without increasing 
stock price if the internal rate of return on the firm’s investments does not exceed the cost of 
capital (Miller and Modigliani 1961). Growth due to growth opportunities and a return on 
investment above the cost of capital is distinguished from expansion of production that grows 
assets and earnings over time but does not generate value above the cost of capital (Chung and 
Chareoenwong 1991). The pre-production related “use of proceeds” in Figure 1 relate to growth 
opportunities and possible future rents. In contrast, the goal to use the proceeds for expansion of 
production does not have implications for future rents and value in the absence of other 
information about the existence of growth opportunities.  
Further, some proposed uses of the proceeds are not directly funding growth. These uses of 
proceeds include repayment of debt, working capital for firms already in production, and firms 
with insiders selling. While these companies might be intending to grow, the proposed use of 
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proceeds is expected to be insufficient information on its own without information about the 
existence of growth opportunities, for evaluating pricing and future performance. 
2.3  Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry relating to the incentives and skills of management and the firm’s 
prospects, and among differentially informed investors, is relatively higher for IPO companies 
compared to listed companies with a public financial history. Firms going public are typically 
younger and in earlier life cycle compared to their listed counterparts (e.g., Ritter 1999).  
The dominant source of information for evaluating the expected performance of IPOs is 
growth opportunities rather than assets in place since growth opportunities relate to future rents 
and value creation (e.g., Ambarish, John and Williams 1987). Pre-production “uses of proceeds” 
relate to growth including the pre-production R&D and exploration investments. These 
expenditures are more risky than the expansion type investments comprising capital expenditures 
and acquisitions (e.g., Chung and Chareoenwong 1991). This suggests a positive association 
between pre-production R&D and exploration investments and the underpricing of the offer. Pre-
production R&D and exploration investments are expected to be value relevant due to the forward 
looking nature of growth investments and stock prices. 
H1: Proposed use of proceeds with growth implications (RD, EXPLORE) are positively 
related to underpricing and are related to future operating and stock performance. 
No sign is predicted for the relation between pre-production R&D and exploration 
investments use of proceeds and future operating and stock performance because risky investments 
can succeed or fail. 
In relation to the “use of proceeds” relating to production, the value of assets in place and 
growth opportunities of the more established IPOs are known to managers but not outsiders (by 
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definition of listing for first time). In the absence of information indicating the existence of growth 
opportunities, “use of proceeds” relating to expansion of production comprising capital 
expenditures and acquisitions (USE_CAPEX and USE_ACQUIRE) are not expected to have stock 
price implications (Chung and Chareoenwong 1991). There might be other information in the 
prospectus or elsewhere that is informative about the value of the offer and future stock 
performance but the CAPEX and ACQUIRE proposed uses of proceeds are not expected to be 
informative on their own about the firms’ ability to generate future rents.  
H2: In the absence of other information about growth opportunities, proposed use of 
proceeds for expansion (CAPEX, ACQUIRE) are not related to underpricing and future stock 
performance.  
2.4  Free Cash Flow and Corporate Governance Issues 
Concerns have been raised by ASIC about the transparency and clarity of prospectus 
disclosures relating to the purpose to which the issue proceeds will be applied. One area of concern 
is companies disclosing that 100 percent of the proceeds will be used for working capital 
(USE_WC). Since it is unclear how this use of proceeds can create value, nominating working 
capital raises concerns about free cash flow abuses. Jensen (1986) proposed the free cash flow 
theory that managers with incentives to grow the firm to a sub-optimal size spend the free cash 
flows in excess of the firm’s positive NPV projects wastefully. In the IPO setting, without other 
information indicating the existence of growth opportunities to which the working capital might be 
applied, investors are expected to respond negatively when working capital is the proposed “use of 
proceeds”, leading to a positive (negative) relation between the working capital “use of proceeds” 
and underpricing (future stock performance).   
The other two “use of proceeds” for which the long-term performance implications are 
unclear is the repayment of debt (USE_REPAY) and the situation where founders are selling 
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shares (USE_CASHOUT). Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) find that IPO’s listing to fund a 
recapitalization of debt are mature firms that have already grown and appear to have few growth 
opportunities suggesting recapitalization of debt is a negative signal about the IPO’s future 
performance. Insider selling is also a negative signal (Leland and Pyle 1977). Selling is viewed 
negatively by investors because selling by founders reduces the alignment between insider and 
new shareholder interests increasing the chances of agency conflicts. This is compounded by 
possible adverse selection problems due to the high level of information asymmetry. On top of 
these uncertainties, Ang and Brau (2003) find that insiders selling shares are successful in taking 
deliberate actions to hide the number of shares they are selling. They find that the founders benefit 
from concealing because the strategy is activated only if higher demand for the shares is revealed 
between the original and subsequent amendment filings. Finally, there is a high level of 
information asymmetry surrounding BACKDOOR listings and possible corporate governance 
issues relating to the founder’s controlling interest in the new IPO (as discussed in Section 2.1). 
Investors are therefore uncertain about the IPO insiders’ incentives, and the firm’s growth 
opportunities and value which leads to the following hypothesis. 
H3: In the absence of other information about growth opportunities, BACKDOOR listings, 
use of proceeds to relieve financial constraints (USE_WC, USE_REPAY), and use of proceeds to 
pay insiders selling their stock (USE_CASHOUT) are positively (negatively) related to 
underpricing (future stock price performance).  
2.5  Minimum Economic Scale and Post-Listing Operating Performance 
An increasing proportion of IPOs are weak firms and/or firms that take on long-term risky 
projects which is associated with a declining rate of IPO survival (Fama and French 2003). 
Audretsch (1995) shows that an important element of survival for new firms entering product 
markets is the firm’s ability to quickly reach the minimum efficient scale (MES) in the industry. 
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He finds that firm survival (growth) is positively (negatively) related to firm size. Given the 
dramatic decline in the survival rate of IPOs documented by Fama and French (2003) over several 
decades, it is predicted that the IPOs that have positive operating performance in the foreseeable 
future are the established IPOs at the listing date already generating revenues from production. 
H4: The proposed “uses of proceeds” for established firms (already in production) at the 
IPO date are positively related to future operating performance. 
2.6  Adverse Selection 
The high levels of information asymmetry in the IPO setting create the potential for adverse 
selection problems (Downes and Heinkel 1982). If there are some informed investors that have 
superior information relative to the firm and other investors, then the issuer will have to underprice 
the stock to induce the uninformed investors to participate (Rock 1986). To maximize the demand 
for the IPO and the proceeds of the issue, the IPO insiders have incentives to signal favorable 
information that they hold about their firm’s unobservable growth opportunities (Verrecchia 1983; 
Dye 1985). This type of disclosure is one of the costs of going public which the issuers trade-off 
against the benefits of access to public proceeds and information intermediaries. In fact, the IPO 
issuers have potentially strong disclosure incentives even in the face of proprietary costs of 
disclosure because of strong demand from investors for information about growth opportunities. 
Signals relating to alterable, observable characteristics of the firm that are costly to mimic 
can distinguish potentially profitable IPOs from unprofitable IPOs (Spence 1973). Underlying 
growth options are not generally observable. Two possible signals are capitalized intangibles in the 
pro forma balance sheet in the prospectus, and registered intellectual property (patents, trademarks, 
and designs) (IP) which are readily searchable on the public databases of the patent office.  
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A large number of studies using different research designs, settings, and financial and 
market-based measures of value suggest that reported intangible assets and researcher constructed 
assets (e.g., from the firm’s expenditures on advertising or R&D) are value relevant (see the 
review in Wyatt 2007). Reported intangibles that do not lead to future rents on average impose a 
future cost on the disclosing firm in terms of a loss of the firm’s reputation for credible reporting 
(Healy and Palepu 1993). In a setting where GAAP allows the reporting of internal and acquired 
intangible assets, the negative stock price effects of investors’ speculations about the information 
issuers are withholding is expected to motivate the reporting of intangible assets if the firm has 
valuable underlying intangibles (Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1985).  
Signaling using IP is costly due to the research and development up front and the 
application costs including the IP attorney’s remuneration and patent office fees. The registered IP 
provides forward-looking information about the nature and period of the issuers’ monopoly over 
the expected benefits from an invention. The patent, trademark, and designs specify the details of 
the “invention”, prior related IP, technology classifications, and the period of the monopoly. IP 
infringements by competitors are regulated through the courts. Registered IP is direct evidence of 
property rights. An inability to obtain property rights over the expected benefits from investment is 
a key uncertainty that adversely affects the firm’s ability to realize the expected benefits from 
investment (Webster 1999). Registered and expected (to be registered) intellectual property is a 
form of verification that the firm has generated an invention and the firm has some control over 
access and use of the invention. While inventions vary greatly in their expected value (Griliches 
1990), compared to investment with no legal property rights, the firm with IP has verifiable 
evidence of growth opportunities. Consistent with this argument, a review of the prospectuses 
indicates that issuers tend to highlight the IP protection.  
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It is therefore proposed that the firms with better prospects (more valuable growth 
opportunities) capitalize intangible assets (obtain IP) to signal quality consistent with Spence 
(1973) and Leland and Pyle (1977). 
H5: Capitalized intangibles and IP are negatively related to underpricing and positively 
related to future stock price and operating performance.  
Reported intangible assets and IP are also expected to provide incremental information 
about growth opportunities so that interactions with the “proposed use of proceeds” are value 
relevant. The positive information effect is expected to be strongest for the pre-production R&D 
investment (USE_RD) because these firms are directly engaged in exercising growth 
opportunities. For exploration firms (USE_EXPLORE), the strength of any relation is an empirical 
issue due to the area of interest basis of accounting which is similar to full cost accounting for oil 
and gas in the US. The effect of the area of interest accounting is that the firm’s exploration 
“asset” includes all expenditures outlaid not just those expected to generate future benefits until 
commercial feasibility is known. 
For the other “uses of proceeds”, the incremental (interaction) effect can be positive or 
negative depending on the level of demand/relative importance of information about growth 
opportunities compared to assets in place; and also on the credibility of the CAP and IPlist 
information in signaling future rents relative to investors’ perceptions of the extent the firm has 
valuable underlying intangible assets.  
H6: Capitalized intangibles and IP condition the relation between the “use of proceeds” 
variables and underpricing, future stock price, and operating performance. 
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Figure 2  Summary of the Hypotheses 
 Underpricing Future Operating 
performance 
Future stock performance 
Hypothesis 1 Proposed use of proceeds with growth implications (RD, EXPLORE) are positively related to underpricing and are 
related to future operating and stock performance. 
USE_RD + +/- +/- 
USE_EXPLORE + +/- +/- 
Hypothesis 2 In the absence of other information about growth opportunities, proposed use of proceeds for expansion (CAPEX, 
ACQUIRE) are not related to underpricing and future stock performance. 
USE_CAPEX Insignificant   Insignificant  
USE_ACQUIRE Insignificant  Insignificant 
Hypothesis 3 : In the absence of other information about growth opportunities, proposed use of proceeds to change/establish new 
core business (BACKDOOR), relieve financial constraints (WC, REPAY), or sell cash flow and control rights (CASHOUT) are 
positively (negatively) related to underpricing (future stock price performance).  
BACKDOOR +  - 
USE_WC +  - 
USE_REPAY +  - 
USE_CASHOUT +  - 
Hypothesis 4 The proposed ”uses of proceeds” for established firms (already in production) at the IPO date are positively related 
to future operating performance. 
USE_WC  +  
USE_CAPEX  +  
USE_ACQUIRE  +  
USE_REPAY  +  
USE_CASHOUT  +  
Hypothesis 5 Capitalized intangibles and IP are negatively related to underpricing and positively related to future stock price and 
operating performance.  
CAP - + + 
IPlist - + + 
Hypothesis 6 Capitalized intangibles and IP condition the relation between the “use of proceeds” variables and underpricing and 
future stock price and operating performance. Negative sign for USE_RD and no sign for other “use of proceeds”. 
BACKDOOR*CAP or IPlist +/- +/- +/- 
PRE-PRODUCTION 
USE_WC*CAP or IPlist +/- +/- +/- 
USE_RD*CAP or IPlist - + + 
USE_EXPLORE*CAP or IPlist +/- +/- +/- 
PRODUCTION 
USE_WC*CAP or IPlist +/- +/- +/- 
USE_INVEST*CAP or IPlist +/- +/- +/- 
USE_CAPEX*CAP or IPlist +/-- +/-- +/-- 
USE_ACQUIRE*CAP or IPlist +/- +/- +/- 
USE_REPAY*CAP or IPlist +/-- +/-- +/-- 
USE_CASHOUT*CAP or IPlist +/-- +/-- +/-- 
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3. Setting and Sample Statistics 
3.1. Institutional Setting 
The Australian setting presents a unique opportunity to study prospectus disclosures. First, 
the proposed “use of proceeds” disclosures are required by the security regulator as previously 
outlined. Second, management has the choice to record intangible assets in the prospectus. Prior to 
the 1 January 2005 adoption of AASB 138 Intangible Assets (IAS 38 Intangible Assets), 
Australian companies had the discretion to capitalize purchased goodwill, research and 
development, and acquired and internally generated identifiable intangible assets.  
Similar to the recent FASB business combinations standard (SFAS 141), AASB 1015 
Acquisition of Assets required (pre-2005) purchased identifiable intangible assets from a business 
combination to be recorded at fair value. Internally generated identifiable intangible assets (except 
internal goodwill) were unregulated in the 1994-2000 period of this study, giving management 
wide discretion. AASB 1013 Accounting for Goodwill prohibited the recognition of internally 
generated goodwill. However, internal goodwill is not a well-defined item and some observed 
internally generated identifiable intangible assets fit the internal goodwill category (e.g., recorded 
assets labeled as “proprietary technology”). 
Third, Australian issuers and investors do not have information revelation from formal 
book building before the issue. Instead, a fixed price mechanism operates in which the issuer and 
underwriter commit to a fixed offer price in the prospectus an average of 65 days before trading 
commences. The primary information source is therefore the prospectus, increasing the probability 
that investors rely on this information and therefore the relevance and power of the tests.  
3.2. Sample and Data  
To ensure only “unseasoned” issues are included in the sample, the sample excludes foreign 
owned or affiliated companies, companies either previously listed on or registered on a foreign 
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stock exchange before listing on the ASX, companies formed through a Scheme of Arrangement, 
trust companies, and privatized public sector entities. The final sample comprises 241 IPOs with a 
prospectus available on the Connect4 database that listed between June 1994 and December 2000. 
Concluding the sample at December 2000 permits after market performance to be examined. 
Data manually collected from the prospectus includes: the dollar breakdown of the 
“proposed use of the issue proceeds”; recorded intangible assets in the prospectus; financial 
characteristics of the firm at the time of initial public offering; historical (pre IPO) performance 
data (if any); the details of the offer; the identity of the underwriter and auditor and investigating 
accountant; and management earnings forecasts. Share price data are extracted from the CRIF 
Share Price Relatives (SPPR) database and SIRCA to compute underpricing and post listing stock 
price performance. Subsequent (post listing) data is obtained from IRESS Technologies and 
ASPECT Financial databases. The Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia in 
collaboration with IP Australia provided the firm level IP data including at the listing date, patent 
applications, patents, trademarks and designs; and for each of five years after the listing date, the 
number of patents, trademarks and designs granted by the patent office. Table 1 summarizes the 
data and variables employed in the study. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the sample of IPOs. In Panel B, the retained 
ownership is a mean 55.1 percent (median 57 percent) while 54 IPOs (22.4 percent) issued shres 
with warrants attached indicating these firms are very risky. There is a large variation in the offer 
size ranging from $0.337 million to $400 million. Panel D shows the mean intangible assets to 
total assets ratio is about the same as prior studies for seasoned companies (i.e., about 10 percent: 
Wyatt 2005; Ritter and Wells 2006). Intangible assets comprise purchased goodwill, capitalized 
R&D, and identifiable intangible assets including items such as patents, trademarks, designs, 
licenses, brands, software, film and broadcasting rights, and technology under development. Fifty-
seven percent of the sample capitalizes intangible assets. Goodwill, identifiable intangibles and 
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R&D are capitalized by 32 percent, 39 percent and 23 percent of the sample, respectively. In Panel 
F, only 2.1 percent of the sample has a count of IP at listing date that is greater than 20 and less 
than 73. Fourteen firms have greater than 10 IP at listing date and 31 firms have greater than two. 
In the post-listing five years, 19.1 percent of the sample is granted IP which is similar to the 20.1 
percent of the sample firms holding IP at the listing date. Panel G shows a mean underpricing of 
22.2 percent with a large range between the maximum of 342.0 percent and a minimum 
(overpricing) of -75.0 percent. The largest firm was $805 million at listing date to an average of 
$2,310 million over the seven years after the listing date, growth of 34.8 percent. However, the 
mean and median average operating performance and free cash flows over the seven years after 
listing are all negative. 
4.  Empirical Analyses 
4.1  Empirical Models  
Table 1 summarizes the measurement of all the variables referred to in this section. To test 
the underpricing hypotheses summarized in Figure 1, equations (1) and (2) are estimated using 
ordinary least squares regressions.  
UNDi,t =χ0 +χ1LOG(Age)i,t + χ2BACKDOORi,t + χ3LOG(Offer)i,t + χ4RETAINi,t + 
χ5DELAYi,t + χ6PIPOi,t+χ7HOTi,t+χ8UWRITERi,t + χ9AUDQUALi,t  + χ10FORECASTi,t + 
χ11USE_WCi,t + χ12USE_RDi,t + χ13USE_Explorei,t +χ14USE_Repayi,t + χ15USE_Capexi,t + 
χ16USE_Acquirei,t + χ17USE_Investi,t+χ18USE_Cashouti,t  +χ19CAPi,t +χ20IPlisti,t + 
+χ21(CAPi,t*IPlisti,t)+χ22(USEj,i,t*CAPi,t)+ χ23(USEj,i,t*IPlisti,t) +χ24(USEj,i,t*CAPi,t*IPlisti,t) 
+ εi,t           (1) 
Equation (2) disaggregates the CAP and IPlist variables to test Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6 
predicts that the capitalized intangible assets (CAP) and IP at the listing date will condition the 
relation between underpricing and the “use of proceeds” variables. However, CAP and IPlist 
include sub-sets of intangible assets and IP which are not relevant for all firms. For example, 
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capitalized extractive industry intangible assets comprising exploration and evaluation costs and 
mining tenement assets are not relevant to other industries. Therefore to test the underpricing 
prediction in Hypothesis 6, the CAP and IPlist variables are disaggregated. Equation (2) is 
estimated separately for each of the eight “use of proceeds” variables. 
UNDi,t =χ0 +χ1BACKDOORi,t +χ2USEj,i,t+χ3LOG(Age)i,t + χ4LOG(Offer)i,t + χ5RETAINi,t 
+ χ6DELAYi,t + χ7PIPOi,t+χ8HOTi,t+χ9UWRITERi,t + χ10AUDQUALi,t  + χ11CAP_GWi,t + 
χ12CAP_RDi,t + χ13CAP_IIAi,t + χ14CAP_EXTRACTi,t +χ15Patapplici,t + χ16Patenti,t + 
χ17Trademarki,t + χ18Designi,t+χ19IPposti,t  +χ20(USEj,i,t*CAP_GWi,t) 
+χ21(USEj,i,t*CAP_RDi,t)+ χ22(USEj,i,t*CAP_IIAi,t)+ χ23(USEj,i,t*CAP_EXTRACTi,t)+ 
χ24(USEj,i,t*Patapplici,t) + χ25(USEj,i,t*Patenti,t) + χ26(USEj,i,t*Trademarki,t) + 
χ27(USEj,i,t*Designi,t) + εi,t        (2) 
 
As summarized in Table 1, the underpricing measure (UND) is the closing price, P1, on the 
first day of listing minus the offer price, P0, divided by the offer price, P0.  
Equations (1) and (2) include variables previously related to underpricing as summarized in 
Table 1. Earnings forecasts are commonly observed in the prospectus. For example, How and Yeo 
(2001) find about 75 percent of IPO firms (in the post-Corporations Law period) voluntarily 
provide point estimates of earnings.6 How and Yeo (2001) find the market penalizes firms that fall 
short of the earnings forecasts provided in their prospectus. The earnings forecast (FORECAST) 
for year 1 (or zero if no forecast is provided in the prospectus) is included in equation (1). No sign 
is predicted.  
Firm age and size proxy for the life cycle stage of the firms, which affects the amount of 
risk. Firm age (AGE) is the number of days from incorporation to listing date. Smaller values of 
AGE indicate the IPO is in earlier life cycle, more speculative and uncertain (Audretsch 1995). 
                                                          
6 Section 1022(1) of the Corporations Law requires prospectus to contain all information that investors and their 
professional advisers would reasonably require and expect to find for the purpose of making an informed decision.  
 24
The size measure is offer size, is also included comprising the offer price multiplied by the number 
of ordinary shares offered (OFFER).  
The demand for the issue is also associated with underpricing. The proxy employed for the 
demand for the issue is the number of days from the date of the prospectus registration to the 
listing date (DELAY). The shorter the delay period (DELAY) the higher the level of demand from 
informed investors, and the more underpricing is needed to overcome the information 
disadvantage of uninformed investors (Rock 1986), leading to a negative association between the 
delay and underpricing (e.g., Lee et al 1996). How and How (2001) provide evidence that firms 
issuing stock with warrants attached, which are options to buy additional shares, have higher 
information asymmetry and are riskier compared to other firms, consistent with the Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri (1997) signaling hypothesis. Accordingly a dummy variable is included for 
packaged IPOs equal to one if the issue is a joint offering of common shares and warrants, and 
zero otherwise (PIPO). A dummy variable also controls for “hot” issue periods equal to one for hot 
issue periods and zero otherwise (HOT). A ‘hot issue’ period (HOT) is one of very high volume of 
IPOs following a period of very high initial returns (Ritter 1984). These can be accompanied by 
higher than usual pricing errors (e.g., Logue and Lindvall 1974). Based on the returns of prior 
IPOs, in the sample period, the hot issue period is October 1996 to June 2000.   
Equations (1) and (2) include proxies for agency conflicts comprising the level of 
ownership retained by the original owners of the IPO (RETAIN), and the quality of the 
underwriter (UWRITER) and auditor and investigating accountants (AUDQUAL). Retained 
ownership signals the quality of the issue and is associated with lower underpricing (Leland and 
Pyle 1977).7 Underwriters and auditors/accounting firms with a higher reputation have been 
                                                          
7 Although, this signal can be misleading if some issuers sell their secondary shares but try to hide the sale to avoid 
sending a negative signal (Ang and Brau 2003).  
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associated with lower underpricing of new issues (e.g., Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Prior studies 
suggest this effect is due to a reduction in the ex ante uncertainty surrounding the IPO.8  
Equations (3)-(6) test the hypothesized relations relating to post-listing operating and 
market performance. Equations (4) and (6) disaggregate CAP and IPlist as discussed above to test 
the incremental effects of the interactions between the “use of proceeds” variables and intangible 
assts and IP arising from Hypothesis 6. Equation (3) is estimated for eight individual years 
including the IPO year and the following seven years. 
NI/TAi,t+1,t+7 =χ0+χ1BVEi,t-n/TAi,t+n+χ2USE_WCi,t + χ3USE_RDi,t 
+χ4USE_Explorei,t+χ5USE_Repayi,t+χ6USE_Capexi,t+χ7USE_Acquirei,t+ 
χ8USE_Investi,t+χ9USE_Cashouti,t+χ11BACKDOORi,t+χ12UWRITERi,t+χ13AUDQUAL,i,t
+χ14CAPi,t+χ15IPlisti,t+χ16INTANGi,t+n/TAi,t+n+χ17IPposti,t+n+εi,t   (3) 
The dependent variable for equation (4) is the average post-listing net income to total assets 
for the seven years following the IPO not including the listing year. Equation (3) includes 
capitalized intangible assets for the individual post-listing years from the sample firms annual 
financial reports and count variable for IP granted in the post-listing five years (IPpost). 
                                                          
8 Underwriters are concerned with their reputation as it is reputation that attracts future issuers (e.g., Simunic 1980; 
Beatty and Ritter 1986). This provides underwriters with incentives to err on the side of conservative monitoring. The 
Australian Corporations Law requires the underwriter, issuer and investigating accountants to form a due diligence 
committee that is responsible for compiling the prospectus. The Corporations Law makes them liable for their own 
omissions from the prospectus. 
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i,t)+ χ28(USEj,i,t*IPposti,t) + εi,t        (4) 
 
Equation (5) is estimated for eight individual years including the IPO year and the 
following seven years. Equation (5) also includes a proxy for the extent the firm’s industry is high 
technology, TECH. This measure is defined using the OECD classification of technology value 
added as summarized in Table 1.  
MVE/TAi,t+1,t+7=χ0 +χ1BVEi,t-n/TAi,t+n +χ2NIi,t+n, /TAi,t+n + χ3USE_WCi,t + χ4USE_RDi,t + 
χ5USE_Explorei,t +χ6USE_Repayi,t + χ7USE_Capexi,t + χ8USE_Acquirei,t + 
χ9USE_Investi,t+χ10USE_Cashouti,t  + χ11BACKDOORi,t + χ12CAP_GWi,t + 
χ13CAP_RDi,t + χ14CAP_IIAi,t + χ15CAP_EXTRACTi,t +χ16Patapplici,t + χ17Patenti,t + 
χ18Trademarki,t + χ19Designi,t+χ20IP_yr1i,t+1 +χ21IP_yr2i,t+1 +χ22IP_yr3i,t+1 +χ23IP_yr4i,t+1 
+χ24IP_yr5i,t+1 +χ25INTANGi,t+n/TAi,t+n+ χ26TECH + εi,t    (5) 
The dependent variable for Equation (6) is the market value of equity deflated by total 
assets averaged over the seven years following the IPO, t+1 to t+7 (not including the IPO year). 
Equation (6) includes the interaction effects for the “use of proceeds” variables and the intangible 
assets and IP. 
MVE/TAi,t+1,t+7=χ0 +χ1BVEi,t-n/TAi,t+n +χ2NIi,t+n, /TAi,t+n + χ3USE_WCi,t + χ4USE_RDi,t + 
χ5USE_Explorei,t +χ6USE_Repayi,t + χ7USE_Capexi,t + χ8USE_Acquirei,t + 
χ9USE_Investi,t+χ10USE_Cashouti,t  + χ11BACKDOORi,t + χ12CAP_GWi,t + 
χ13CAP_RDi,t + χ14CAP_IIAi,t + χ15CAP_EXTRACTi,t +χ16Patapplici,t + χ17Patenti,t + 
χ18Trademarki,t + χ19Designi,t+χ20IPposti,t+1 + +χ21(USEj,i,t*CAP_GWi,t) 
+χ22(USEj,i,t*CAP_RDi,t)+ χ23(USEj,i,t*CAP_IIAi,t)+ χ24(USEj,i,t*CAP_EXTRACTi,t)+ 
 27
χ25(USEj,i,t*Patapplici,t) + χ26(USEj,i,t*Patenti,t) + χ27(USEj,i,t*Trademarki,t) + 
χ28(USEj,i,t*Designi,t) + χ29(USEj,i,t*IPposti,t) + εi,t    (6) 
 
Table 3 provides Spearman Rho correlations for the dependent and independent variables.  
PUT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Starting at the top of the table, BACKDOOR is significantly positively correlated with 
USE_WC and USE_explore indicating that working capital and extractive industry exploration are 
the two primary “uses of proceeds” nominated by the BACKDOOR listed companies. The AGE 
correlations reveal the oldest companies are in the USE_REPAY and USE_CASHOUT “use of 
proceeds” categories. The USE_REPAY and USE_CASHOUT also have the largest sales and 
leverage (LIA/TA prospectus) indicating the companies nominating these two “uses of proceeds” 
are established companies. Looking at the established company issue further, the PPE/TA 
(prospectus) is positive and significant for the USE_REPAY, USE_ACQUIRE, USE_CAPEX, 
and USE_CASHOUT which suggests these are all established companies with material assets in 
place. This conclusion is consistent with the classification of these four proposed “uses of 
proceeds” in the production grouping reflecting the fact that the proposed expenditures relate to 
already existing production processes. Working capital (USE_WC) is also included in this 
production grouping. It is not clear from the Spearman Rho correlations that this is descriptive. 
However, an untabulated regression of the USE_WC variable on the variables in Table 3 confirms 
the USE_WC tend to be established firms. Specifically, the untabulated regression indicates that in 
a multivariate analysis the firms nominating higher amounts of USE_WC are larger as measured 
by positive significant relations with the offer size and financial leverage (i.e., banks are usually 
unwilling to lend to firms without an established stream of cash inflows).  
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Table 3 also reveals the companies relating to the USE_WC, USE_RD and BACKDOOR 
listings have lower reputation underwriters while the USE_EXPLORE companies have lower 
quality auditors. These findings are not that surprising given the free cash flow and corporate 
governance issues flagged earlier relating to USE_WC and BACKDOOR and the usually small 
size and high risk associated with R&D (USE_RD) and exploration (USE_EXPLORE) companies. 
Moving on to the IP, the USE_RD and USE_CASHOUT companies have significant IP at 
the date of listing and also are granted significant IP in the post-listing five years. Disaggregating 
the IP into its constituent parts shows that the USE_RD companies’ IP at the listing date includes 
significant numbers of patent applications and patents. In contrast, the USE_CASHOUT 
companies’ IP comprises primarily trademarks. The correlations also suggest that the 
USE_CASHOUT firms have the highest underpricing of the offer while the USE_EXPLORE 
firms have the lowest underpricing. This may in part reflect differences in the reputation of the 
underwriters which has been linked to the level of underpricing. The cashout firms have high 
reputation underwriters whereas the correlation between underwriter and USE_EXPLORE is not 
significant. Finally, the better (poorer) average operating performers over the seven years post-
listing are the companies relating to the USE_REPAY and USE_CASHOUT (USE_WC, 
USE_RD, USE_EXPLORE, USE_BACKDOOR).  
4.2  Underpricing Results 
Table 4 reports the results for the underpricing hypothesis tests from equation (1).  
PUT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that USE_RD and USE_EXPLORE are associated with higher 
underpricing due to the pre-production phase and risk of the proposed investments. This 
hypothesis is robustly supported for USE_RD but not for USE_EXPLORE. The coefficients for 
USE_EXPLORE are always positive in Table 4 but significant only in one of the ten regressions in 
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Table 4. This result is surprising in that exploration is inherently risky. A possible explanation is 
that financial intermediaries and investors rely heavily on expert reports for mining IPOs which is 
a correlated omitted variable. Consistent with this notion, the securities regulator, ASIC, has stated 
that “it is prepared to ensure that mining companies adequately disclose their prospects in a 
prospectus”.9 One example is an interim stop order issued by ASIC on 23 February 2001 that 
prevented Tawana Resources (NL) from offering or issuing securities under its prospectus (ASIC 
2001, 01/085). ASIC’s stated concerns related to lack of clarity and detail in the prospectus and an 
expert report relating to a gold project in Botswana which ASIC considered to be confusing. ASIC 
sought its own independent expert advice and required Tawana to lodge a detailed supplementary 
prospectus including further information on: the expiry and renewal of various tenements; 
breakdowns on the application of funds raised to meet objectives; exploration programs and 
timing; option agreement over Flinders Island Diamond Project; and an additional report from the 
Independent Technical Consultant clarifying various aspects of the first report, including its 
compliance with the VALMIN Code.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that USE_CAPEX and USE_ACQUIRE will not be significantly 
associated with underpricing, in the absence of other information about growth opportunities, 
because these expenditures relate to expansion and not directly to future rents. The results are 
generally consistent with hypothesis. The coefficient for USE_CAPEX is insignificant in eight of 
the ten regressions in Table 4 and the USE_ACQUIRE coefficient is insignificant in seven of the 
ten regressions in Table 4.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the BACKDOOR, USE_WC, USE_REPAY and 
USE_CASHOUT variables are associated with higher underpricing due to free cash flow and 
corporate governance concerns. This hypothesis is supported for USE_WC and USE_CASHOUT 
consistent with the latter concerns in Table 4. The USE_REPAY coefficient is positive and 
                                                          
9 http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/01%2F085+ASIC+seeks+clarity+on+diamond+prospectus? 
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significant in four of the ten regressions providing some evidence consistent with hypothesis 3. 
However the BACKDOOR coefficient is not significant in Table 4.  
Hypothesis 5 predicts that capitalized intangible assets and the firm’s stock of IP at the 
listing date are associated with lower underpricing. Hypothesis 5 is supported. The coefficients for 
CAP and IPlist are generally negative and significant. This evidence is consistent with these 
variables signaling valuable underlying growth opportunities and control over underlying valuable 
assets.  
Hypothesis 6 predicts that CAP and IPlist interact with the “use of proceeds” variables. The 
interaction with the pre-production “use of proceeds”, USE_RD, is expected to be associated with 
lower underpricing due to the saliency of the information about growth opportunities for these 
firms. However, as argued earlier, the result for the exploration “use of proceeds” interaction with 
CAP and IPlist is an empirical issue due to the area of interest accounting method and the fact that 
exploration firms typically do not engage in R&D and have few intangibles other than mining 
tenements.  
For to the remaining firms, the incremental interaction effect is expected to be positive or 
negative depending on the level of demand/relative importance of information about growth 
opportunities compared to assets in place; and also on the credibility of the CAP and IPlist 
information in signaling future rents relative to investors’ perceptions of the extent the firm has 
valuable underlying intangible assets.  
The results are consistent with Hypothesis 6 for USE_RD (pre-production) for both CAP 
and IPlist as predicted. The disaggregated intangibles and IP results in Table 5 show that this 
incremental reduction in underpricing relates to capitalization of R&D and identifiable intangible 
assets, and the ownership by trademarks by USE_RD firms. For the remaining “use of proceeds” 
variables, there is an incremental decrease (increase) in underpricing for USE_ACQUIRE and 
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USE_CASHOUT firms (USE_WC and BACKDOOR) that capitalize intangible assets. This 
suggests that the agency and corporate governance issues associated with the working capital and 
BACKDOOR “proposed use of proceeds” leads to higher underpricing. Table 5 shows that this 
increase in underpricing relates to capitalized goodwill for the USE_WC and BACKDOOR firms. 
This is also consistent with other evidence in the Australian setting which suggests that purchased 
goodwill is not always value relevant or positively valued (e.g., Wyatt 2005).  
Other insights from the disaggregation of intangible assets and IP in Table 5 are as follows. 
The USE_REPAY firms with trademarks at listing date experience incrementally higher 
underpricing which is consistent with the perception that the debt repayment firms have few 
growth opportunities consistent with Pagano et al (1998). The USE_ACQUIRE firms experience 
an incremental reduction in underpricing when they report goodwill assets, identifiable intangible 
assets or extractive industry intangible assets in the prospectus, and own patents at the listing date; 
suggesting that these assets and IP signal growth opportunities and valuable property rights over 
the firms’ assets, respectively.  
PUT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Finally, compared to prior studies, the control variables play a much less important role in 
explaining the level of underpricing once the “use of proceeds”, intangible assets, and IP are 
included in the regressions. In particular, the positive association between the age, size and 
retained ownership variables (AGE, OFFER, RETAIN) is not observed in Tables 4 and 5 
suggesting these effects are subsumed by the additional variables. The correlations in Table 3 
confirm this conjecture. For example, retained ownership is highest for the USE_WC, USE_RD 
and USE_REPAY firms and is lowest for the USE_EXPLORE and BACKDOOR firms. One 
exception is the underwriter quality for which the coefficients in Table 4 are positive and 
significant in each regression suggesting that higher reputation underwriters are associated with 
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higher underpricing of the offers. This result is consistent with prior studies that argue the 
underpricing is a deliberate action by underwriters and can be explained by a number of factors 
relating to underwriter reputation and asymmetric information (see Ritter 1999). 
Underpricing Results Summary—the underpricing results are consistent with (1) higher 
underpricing for USE_RD as predicted in Hypothesis 1 but not for USE_EXPLORE; (2) an 
insignificant association with underpricing for USE_CAPEX and USE_ACQUIRE as predicted in 
Hypothesis 2 due to these two “uses of proceeds” predicting expansion but not future rents (in the 
absence of other information about the existence of growth opportunities); (3) higher underpricing 
for USE_WC and USE_CASHOUT as predicted in Hypothesis 3 (due to free cash flow and 
corporate governance concerns) but Hypothesis 3 is not supported for BACKDOOR and 
USE_REPAY; (4) lower underpricing for firms capitalizing intangibles and owning IP at listing 
date as predicted in Hypothesis 5 consistent with these variables reflecting quality signals relating 
to growth opportunities; and (5) incremental reduction in underpricing for USE_RD firms 
capitalizing intangibles and owning IP at listing date as predicted in Hypothesis 6 as well as an 
incremental underpricing reduction (increase) for USE_ACQUIRE and USE_CASHOUT 
(BACKDOOR and USE_WC) firms capitalizing or owning IP at listing date. This latter result 
suggests that intangible assets and IP are perceived to reflect growth opportunities for the 
acquisition and cashout firms but not for backdoor listing and the working capital “use of 
proceeds” firms. 
4.3  Operating Performance Results 
Table 6 reports the results for the post listing operating performance tests.  
PUT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Hypothesis 1 predicts an association between operating performance and USE_RD and 
USE_EXPLORE but no sign because these firms can succeed or fail. In the time period of this 
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study, Table 6 shows a significant negative relation between USE_EXPLORE and the future 
operating performance in the individual year regressions in Table 6 but no relation for USE_RD. 
The additional operating performance results in Table 7 using the seven year average of post-
listing return on assets confirm no relation for USE_RD and a significant negative relation for 
USE_EXPLORE (first column of Table 7) consistent with the high risk exploration activities. 
PUT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Hypothesis 4 predicts positive relations between future operating performance and 
USE_WC, USE_CAPEX, USE_ACQUIRE, USE_REPAY and USE_CASHOUT based on the 
more established nature of these firms and lower likelihood that these more established firms will 
fail because they are unable to attain the minimum efficient scale for the industry (e.g., Audretch 
1995). The results in Tables 6 and 7 are mixed. The only significant variable of these five variables 
is working capital (USE_WC) in Table 6 but the sign is negative not the predicted positive sign. 
The Table 7 results are consistent with Hypothesis 4 for USE_REPAY and USE_CASHOUT. 
However, USE_CAPEX and USE_ACQUIRE are not associated with future operating 
performance. This negative relation for USE_WC is consistent with the ASIC concerns about the 
vagueness of nominating “working capital” as a proposed “use of proceeds”. 
Hypothesis 5 predicts positive relations between capitalized intangible assets, IP owned at 
listing date and future operating performance. The results in Table 6 are not consistent with 
Hypothesis 5. Disaggregated results for the intangibles and IP in Table 7 suggest that capitalized 
R&D is robustly negatively related to future operating performance, capitalized identifiable 
intangibles are positively related to operating performance but this result is not robust across all 
firms, listing date owned patents are negatively related to operating performance, and designs are 
positively related to post-listing performance with these last two results also not holding for all 
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firms. We can conclude that the intangibles and IP are not robust signals of future operating 
performance on their own. 
Hypothesis 6 predicts that the intangible assets and IP condition the relations between the 
use of proceeds and operating performance. The results are consistent with this hypothesis. First, 
the positive relation predicted for USE_RD firms between capitalized intangibles, IP and future 
performance is confirmed. Table 7 shows that capitalized R&D assets and ownership of patents at 
the listing date are associated with the average (seven year) operating performance for the 
USE_RD firms. The USE_CAPEX firms experience an incremental negative operating 
performance effect in the future if they have reported R&D assets in the prospectus and own 
patents at the listing date but experience positive operating performance if these firms have patent 
applications pending at the listing date. The results for the BACKDOOR listing firms are similar 
to the USE_CAPEX firms except the negative future performance relates to pre-existing goodwill 
on the balance sheet at the listing date rather than R&D assets. 
These results for the USE_RD “pre-production” firms, USE_CAPEX “already in 
production” firms, and BACKDOOR listing firms suggest that it is the maturing growth options 
that are important for future operating performance and not the already matured growth options. 
That is, all the USE_RD growth opportunities are still maturing whereas the USE_CAPEX firms’ 
existing patents and BACKDOOR existing goodwill assets are already in production and it is the 
patent applications pending that are yet to mature and therefore are relevant for evaluating these 
firms’ future rents. 
Operating Performance Results Summary—the future operating performance results are as 
follows. First, Hypothesis 1 predicts that USE_RD and USE_EXPLORE are associated with future 
operating performance and the results are consistent for USE_EXPLORE but not USE_RD. 
Hence, it is not enough to know that an IPO is planning to raise funds for R&D projects to predict 
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the firm’s future operating performance. However, raising funds for exploration predicts negative 
future operating performance on average. Second, Hypothesis 4 predicts a positive relation 
between USE_WC, USE_CAPEX, USE_ACQUIRE and USE_CASHOUT because on average 
these companies are already established when they list. The results suggest Hypothesis 4 only 
holds for the most established firms with the highest historical (pre-IPO) operating performance 
(see the correlations with historical NI/TA in Table 3), which are the USE_REPAY and 
USE_CASHOUT firms. On average, these latter firms exhibit positive operating performance in 
the post-listing years. Hence, we can evaluate the future performance prospects using information 
on the scale and historical performance of the IPO. On the other hand, the “use of proceeds” 
information on its own is not useful at all for evaluating future operating performance if the firm is 
established but did not perform well historically and is proposing to raise funds for expansion (i.e., 
the USE_CAPEX and USE_ACQUIRE firms). Third, Hypotheses five predicts a positive 
association between capitalized intangibles, IP and future operating performance. The results 
suggest the sign and significance of these relations depends on the type of intangible and IP. 
Fourth, Hypothesis 6 predicts that intangibles and IP condition the relation between the “use of 
proceeds” and operating performance. The results are consistent with this hypothesis suggesting 
that capitalized intangible assets and IP owned are two classes of relevant conditioning variables 
that can supplement some types of “proposed uses of proceeds” in evaluating future expected 
operating performance. The results suggest that capitalized intangible assets and listing date IP are 
most relevant for supplementing the USE_RD, USE_CAPEX, and BACKDOOR information. 
4.4  Stock Market Performance Results 
Tables 8 and 9 provide the results for the stock market performance tests. The dependent 
variable in Table 8 is the annual market value of equity deflated by total assets for the end of the 
listing fiscal year and the following seven post-listing years (MVE/TA). To facilitate unbiased 
significance tests, the dependent variable is logged to reduce the wide dispersion in the raw data. 
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The dependent variable in Table 9 is the average MVE/TA for the seven years t1 to t7 after the 
listing year. 
PUT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the pre-production “uses of proceeds”, USE_RD and 
USE_EXPLORE, are associated with future market performance. The results in Table 8 are 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. USE_RD (USE_EXPLORE) is significantly positively (negatively) 
associated with future market performance. The significant positive R&D effect persists for five 
years after the listing year while the significant negative exploration “use of proceeds” effect 
persists for three years after listing. This evidence suggests investors believe the R&D “use of 
proceeds” firms have growth opportunities that will generate future rents on average while the 
exploration “use of proceeds” firms do not have valuable growth opportunities on average 
(probably because failure to find viable reserves is more likely than finding viable reserves). The 
gestation period for the two types of investments also appears to differ with a longer period for 
R&D compared to exploration. 
PUT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the expansion investments, USE_CAPEX and USE_ACQUIRE 
are not associated with stock performance in the absence of other information about the firms’ 
growth opportunities. The results in Tables 8 and 9, taken together are consistent with this 
prediction. The coefficients for USE_CAPEX and USE_ACQUIRE are negative and significant in 
Table 8, three years ahead for CAPEX and eight years ahead for ACQUIRE. In Table 9, the 
coefficients for the variables USE_CAPEX and USE_ACQUIRE on their own are insignificant as 
predicted in Hypothesis 2 after including interactions in the regression to capture additional 
information about growth opportunities (where USE_CAPEX and USE-ACQUIRE are interacted 
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with capitalized intangible assets, IP at listing date, and IP granted in the post-listing period). 
Hypothesis 2 is therefore supported. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that BACKDOOR, USE_WC, USE_REPAY, USE_CASHOUT are 
negatively associated with stock performance in the absence of other information about the firms’ 
growth opportunities. It was argued earlier that this result is expected due to investor concerns 
about free cash flows and/or corporate governance issues. The results in Table 8 and taken with the 
interaction results in Table 9 are consistent with Hypothesis 3 for all four of the variables above. 
The coefficients for USE_WC are negative and significant in every year in Table 8. The 
coefficients for BACKDOOR are always negative and are significant in the first and fourth years 
in Table 8 and the BACKDOOR coefficient in Table 9 is negative and significant as predicted, 
overall confirming Hypothesis 3. The coefficients for USE_REPAY are negative and significant in 
six of the eight years in Table 8 and the coefficient is negative and significant in Table 9 
confirming Hypothesis 3. Finally, the USE_CASHOUT coefficients are always negative and are 
significant in the second and third years post-listing in Table 8 providing some evidence consistent 
with Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that capitalized intangibles and IP at listing date are positively related 
to post-listing market performance. The results in Tables 8 and 9 are consistent with this 
Hypothesis only for capitalized exploration costs and mining tenements (EXTRACT/TA).  
Table 9 results suggest that the control variable, IP granted in the post-listing period by the 
patent office (IPpost), is positively and significantly related to market performance. In fact, IPpost 
is not associated with operating performance in the tests reported in Table 7. IPpost is also not 
positively associated with operating performance interactively with the “use of proceeds” 
variables, which suggests that investors are emphasizing information not associated with operating 
performance. We return to consider this issue at the conclusion of this section. 
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Hypothesis 6 predicts that capitalized intangibles and IP condition the relations between the 
“use of proceeds” variables and market performance. The results for Hypothesis 6 indicate that the 
lack of support for Hypothesis 5 is due to the fact that capitalized intangibles and IP are 
conditioning variables that provide information to investors about growth opportunities 
incrementally to the “use of proceeds” information. Table 9 shows that different types of 
intangible assets and IP are value relevant (with either positive or negative signs) for the different 
proposed “uses of proceeds”.  
What is most striking from Table 9 is that the intangibles and IP on which investors 
condition the various “uses of proceeds” are not the same intangibles and IP that condition the 
various “use of proceeds” relations with future operating performance. For example, purchased 
goodwill interactions with USE_REPAY, USE-CAPEX, USE_INVEST, and USE_CASHOUT 
are all positively and significantly associated with market performance. However, none of these 
interactions are associated with the firms’ post-listing operating performances over the same seven 
year period.  
Another example is patents and patent applications from Tables 7 and 9. Specifically, 
patent application interactions with USE_RD, USE_REPAY and BACKDOOR are significantly 
negatively related to market performance. Further, the patent application interaction with 
USE_CAPEX is not significantly related to market performance. However, patent application 
interactions with USE_CAPEX and BACKDOOR are positively significantly associated with 
future operating performance while the USE_RD and USE_REPAY patent application interaction 
is unrelated to operating performance.  
Further, patent interactions with USE_CAPEX and BACKDOOR are significantly 
positively related to market performance while the patent interaction with USE_RD is unrelated to 
market performance. Almost the opposite is observed for operating performance. The patent 
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interaction with USE_RD is positively significantly associated with operating performance while 
the patent interactions with USE_CAPEX and BACKDOOR are significantly negatively 
associated with operating performance. Similar types of differences are observed for trademarks 
and designs.  
These differences could be due to a lead-lag relation between the valuations and the 
operating performance. Another possibility is that investors do not understand the implications of 
different types of capitalized intangible assets and IP for the operating performance of different 
types of firms. Investors also may not take into account the difference between intangibles and IP 
that are already mature and generating only a normal return and intangibles and IP that has yet to 
mature and are therefore capable of generating rents into the future. 
Market Performance Results Summary—the results in this section are as follows (1) the 
Hypothesis 1 prediction is supported that pre-production related “proposed uses of proceeds’ 
(USE_RD and USE_EXPLORE) relate to growth and are therefore value relevant and associated 
with future market performance; (2) the Hypothesis 2 prediction is supported that the “proposed 
uses of proceeds” relating to expansion of assets rather than growth through future rents 
(USE_CAPEX, USE_ACQUIRE) are not significantly associated with market performance in the 
absence of other information about the firms’ growth opportunities (3) the Hypothesis 3 prediction 
is supported  that the “proposed uses of proceeds” that give rise to free cash flows and corporate 
governance concerns (BACKDOOR, USE_WC, USE_REPAY, USE_CASHOUT) are 
significantly negatively associated with market performance in the absence of other information 
about the firms’ growth opportunities; (4) the Hypothesis 5 prediction that capitalized intangibles 
and IP are value relevant growth and/or quality signals is generally not supported; and (5) the 
Hypothesis 6 prediction that capitalized intangible assets and IP combine with some types of 
“proposed uses of proceeds” to impact market value is supported, however, the results generally 
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differ from the nature and signs of the interactions that are significantly associated with the sample 
firms’ operating performance over the same seven year post-listing period. 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper examines whether the mandated “proposed use of proceeds” and voluntary 
disclosures of intangible assets in the prospectus, along with public information relating to 
ownership of IP, explains some of the variation in underpricing and post-listing performance. 
Disclosures of the proposed use of proceeds are mandatory. ASIC frequently issue stop orders on 
IPO prospectus due to issues with disclosure and one such issue is the detail and clarity of the use 
of proceeds disclosures. Studying the links between prospectus disclosures and IPO pricing and 
performance is important given the dearth of relevant financial information and the central 
information role of the prospectus.  
Not all firms going public are equally assured of success. Information asymmetry relating 
to firm value is reflected in pricing anomalies which are problematic to the extent they reflect 
market inefficiencies. Prior studies have examined a number of possible determinants of these 
anomalies including IPO attributes (see Ritter 1999), disclosure strategies (e.g., Hanley and 
Hoberg 2007), and information asymmetry and incentive effects such as the reputation of financial 
intermediaries (e.g., Rock 1986). This study contributes new insights to this literature on the 
usefulness of prospectus and IP data for evaluating the likelihood of success. 
The results from this study indicate that the “use of proceeds” information is useful for 
evaluating the level of underpricing and future operating and market performance. Consistent with 
the theoretical arguments, factors that are important in interpreting the “use of proceeds” and the 
capitalized intangible assets and IP information are whether or not the company is in the pre-
production or production phase and the amount of information provided that relates to the firm’s 
stock of growth opportunities, concerns relating to free cash flow and corporate governance issues, 
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whether the firm has scale economies and how well the firm performed historically, and adverse 
selection issues that lead to investor demand for information about the firms’ growth opportunities.  
There are many differences in the “use of proceeds”, intangibles and IP information that are 
associated with future operating performance compared to future market performance. Several 
possible explanations for future research include omitted correlated variables such as expert 
reports for exploration companies, and lead/lag relations between operating performance and 
valuation. Other possibilities include the “limited attention” explanation for pricing anomalies 
proposed by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2005) that investors condition their expectations on subsets but 
not all of the available public information. This behavior is more likely in uncertain settings such 
as the IPO market in which financial information is scarce and information reliability is difficult to 
evaluate. Investors may not understand the implications of different types of capitalized intangible 
assets and IP for the operating performance of different types of firms. This could be a function of 
the changing value relevance of intangibles and IP over time, industries and a business strategy, 
which is difficult to predict ex ante (see the Wyatt 2007 review). Investors may not take into 
account the difference between intangibles and IP that are already mature and generating only a 
normal return and intangibles and IP that have yet to mature and are therefore capable of 
generating rents into the future.  
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TABLE 1  MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES  
Explanatory variables Denoted by    Measured as Predicted 
signs 
UND       Perform. 
Model       Model 
PROPOSED USE OF ISSUE PROCEEDS AS REPORTED IN THE PROSPECTUS  
(DUMMY variable or CONTINUOUS variable deflated by the total proceeds expected to be raised) 
Working capital USE_WC 
 







Proposed use of issue proceeds to undertake 
research and development.  
  
Exploration USE_Explore Proposed use of issue proceeds is exploration, 
evaluation and development in extractive 
industry.  
  
Repay debt USE_Repay Proposed use of issue proceeds to pay down 
debt.  
  
Capital expenditures USE_Capex Proposed use of issue proceeds is firm 
commitment to capital expenditures.  
  
Acquisition  USE_Acquire Proposed use of issue proceeds to make 
acquisitions of business or companies.  
  
Invest USE_Invest Proposed use of issue proceeds to invest in 
securities.  
  
Cashout USE_Cashout Proposed use of issue proceeds is to enable the 
founder(s) to cash out of their company.  
  
INTANGIBLE ASSETS REPORTED IN THE PROSPECTUS  
Intangible assets INTANG/TA Intangible assets recorded in the prospectus 
pro forma balance sheet divided by pro 




IIA/TA Identifiable intangible assets recorded in the 
prospectus pro forma balance sheet divided 




RD/TA Research and development assets recorded in 
the prospectus pro forma balance sheet 
divided by pro forma total assets. 
- + 
Goodwill assets GW/TA Goodwill assets recorded in the prospectus 
pro forma balance sheet divided by pro 




EXTRACT/TA Exploration, evaluation and development and 
mining tenement assets recorded in the 
prospectus pro forma balance sheet divided 
by pro forma total assets. 
- + 
Firm reports intangible 






Dummy variable taking a value of one for 
firms recording intangible assets in the 
prospectus pro forma balance sheet and zero 
otherwise. 
- +/- 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IPO 
IPO firm age AGE The number of calendar days from incorporation to the date of prospectus. 
-  
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Explanatory variables Denoted by    Measured as Predicted 
signs 
UND       Perform. 
Model       Model 
Backdoor listing  BACKDOOR Relisting of inactive companies as new companies with name change and/or 
establishment of entirely new core business 
(e.g., dot com) 
+/- +/- 
Size of the offer OFFER The product of offer price times the number of ordinary shares offered in the issue, in 2000 
Dollars. 
+/- +/- 
Retained ownership RETAIN One minus the number of shares offered in the prospectus as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding after the IPO. 
- +/- 
Demand for the issue DELAY The number of days from the date of prospectus registration to the listing date. 
+ - 
Joint offerings of 
common shares and 
options  
PIPO Dummy variable taking a value of one for IPOs that are joint offerings of common shares 




reputation  UWRITER 
The dollar value of all shares underwritten by 
a given underwriter divided by the dollar 
value of all IPOs. The measure is weighted to 







AUDQUAL The fees paid by the sample companies audited or investigated by a given auditor or 
accounting firm divided by the dollar value of 
all fees paid by the IPO firms for these 
services. The measure is weighted where the 
auditor and investigating accountant are not 
the same firm. 
- +/- 
Historical pre-IPO 
operating performance  NI/TA
PRE-IPO Average historical net operating profit as 
reported in the prospectus for the years prior 
to the IPO, divided by the prospectus pro 
forma total assets. 
-  
Leverage LIAB/TA Total liabilities divided by total assets from the prospectus pro forma balance sheet. 
-  
Retained earnings RETAIN/TA Retained earnings divided by total assets from the prospectus pro forma balance sheet. 
-  
Technological 
complexity of business 
and products 
TECH Dummy variable coded 1 for higher 
technology industries and 0 for lower 
technology industries based on the OECD 
classification10 
+/- +/- 
IPO earnings forecast FORECAST The issuers’ earnings forecasts reported in the 
prospectus or zero otherwise. 
- +/- 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IPO MARKET 
Hot issue period  HOT Dummy variable indicator of market state taking a value of one from October 1996 to 
June 2000. 
- - 
REGISTERED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IP) 
                                                          
10 OECD Science and Technology division uses R&D intensity statistics to classify industries on technology bases as 
follows: High and medium-high tech – aerospace, office and computing equipment, drugs and medicines, radio, TV and 
communications equipment, motor vehicles, professional goods, chemicals, electrical machinery, non-electrical 
machinery, other transport industries; Medium-low and low tech – rubber and plastics, non-metallic mineral products, 
shipbuilding, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, metal products, petroleum, other manufacturing, all other industries. 
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Explanatory variables Denoted by    Measured as Predicted 
signs 
UND       Perform. 
Model       Model 
Registered IP held by 
the firm at the IPO 
listing date 
IPlist Count of the patents, patent applications, 
trademarks and designs held by the firm at the 
listing date 
- +/- 
Patent application  Patapplic Count of the firm’s patent applications 
pending at the listing date 
- +/- 
Patent Patent Count of the firm’s patents at the listing date - +/- 
Trademark   Trademark  Count of the firm’s trademarks at the listing 
date 
- +/- 
Design   Design  Count of the firm’s designs at the listing date - +/- 
IP applications and 
grants in the five years 







Count of the grants of the firm’s patents, 
trademarks and designs in the five years after 
the listing date (in total is IPpost and each of 
the five years is IP_yr1 etc.) 
- +/- 
IPO MARKET AND OPERATING PERFORMANCE 







−=  where P1 is the closing 
price on the first day of listing and P0 is the 
offer price.  
  
Market value of equity MVE/TA Market value of equity is number of common shares on issue at the end of the fiscal year 
multiplied by balance date closing stock price 
and divided by total assets. 
  
Operating performance NI/TA Net profit divided by total assets from the 
annual financial report.  
  
     
 
 
TABLE 2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Panel A  Distribution of IPOs by GICS Industry Codes 
GICS Code Industry Count Percent  
10 Energy 10 4.15  
15 Materials 45 18.67  
20 Industrial 38 15.77  
25 Consumer discretionary 33 13.69  
30 Consumer staple 13 5.39  
35 Healthcare 16 6.64  
40 Financial 18 7.47  
45 Information technology 50 20.75  
50 Telecommunications 16 6.64  
55 Utilities 2 0.83  
Total  241 100.00  
 











(eps) PIPO BACKDOOR 
Mean 2,261 21,260,028 6.610 16.095 0.551 3.523   
Median 912 8,000,000 6.817 15.895 0.570 0.000   
Maximum 34,264 400,000,000 10.442 19.807 0.995 25.000   
Minimum 0 337,083 0.000 12.728 0.000 -12.700   
Std. Dev. 3,942 46,847,818 1.714 1.094 0.208 5.512   
# With 
 attribute       54 62 
# Without 
 attribute       187 179 
 
Panel C  Proposed Use of Proceeds in DOLLARS as Reported in the Prospectus – Deflated by the 


















Mean 0.507 0.027 0.100 0.065 0.053 0.017 0.119 0.130 
Median 0.451 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 0.700 0.963 1.000 0.944 1.000 1.000 0.892 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.325 0.101 0.193 0.186 0.139 0.121 0.262 0.260 
         
# Firms with some  
use of proceeds in this category 232 22 93 44 59 6 52 52 
# Firms with NO use 
 of proceeds in this category 9 219 148 197 182 235 189 189 
 
TABLE 2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS CONTINUED  
Panel D Financial Attributes Reported in the Prospectus 
 INTANG/TA GW/TA IIA/TA RD/TA EXTRACT/TA RETAIN/TA LIAB/TA NI/TAPRE-IPO 
Mean 0.122 0.044 0.069 0.005 0.090 -0.120 0.208 0.011 
Median 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.102 0.000 
Maximum 0.813 0.832 0.751 0.180 0.999 0.306 0.998 0.381 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -15.117 0.000 -0.500 
Std. Dev. 0.191 0.119 0.153 0.023 0.188 0.926 0.235 0.084 
         
# With attribute 138 (57%) 78 (32%) 94 (39%) 23 (10%) 56 (23%)    
# Without 




(90%) 185 (77%)    
Panel F  Registered Intellectual Property Held by the IPO Firms 
 IP at the Listing Date IP Granted in the Five Years After Listing Date  






r3 IP_yr4 IP_yr5 
Mean 3 1 0 2 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max. 72 34 37 39 2 80 28 27 25 9 13 
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Std. Dev. 7 3 3 5 0 8 3 3 2 1 1 





  0 155 64.3   0  147 60.9  
  1 21 8.7   1  31 12.9  
  2 15 6.2   2  17 7.1  
  >2 31 12.9   >2  34 14.1  
  >10 14 5.8   >10  5 2.1  
  >20<73 5 2.1   >20<81 7 2.9  
   241 100.0     241 100.0  
Panel G  IPO Performance Characteristics 
   
Financial Ratios are the Average for the Seven Years (t1 to t7) after the 
Listing Date (but not including the listing year) 
 UND 
MVE (end of 













 Mean 0.222 55,921,653 80,984,148 1.284 0.129 0.370 -0.235 0.796 -0.184 
 Median 0.088 13,792,381 17,303,907 0.868 0.055 0.359 -0.135 0.424 -0.123 
 Maximum 3.420 805,000,000 2,310,000,000 11.480 0.789 0.930 0.304 5.978 0.421 
 Minimum -0.750 892,331 1,049,558 0.109 0.000 0.006 -4.286 0.000 -1.702 
 Std. Dev. 0.534 117,000,000 227,000,000 1.414 0.166 0.232 0.439 1.049 0.245 
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TABLE 3  SPEARMAN’S RHO CORRELATIONS 
SPEARMAN’S RHO USE_WC USE_RD USE_REPAY USE_ACQUIRE USE_CAPEX USE_INVEST USE_CASHOUT USE_EXPLORE BACKDOOR 
BACKDOOR 0.15 -0.12 -0.10 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.18 0.25  
 2.31* -1.94* -1.59 -0.18 0.45 -0.50 -2.78* 4.03**  
AGE -0.12 0.05 0.17 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.30 -0.16 -0.08 
 -1.93* 0.82 2.64* -1.09 -0.13 -0.68 4.81** -2.53* -1.29 
OFFER -0.27 -0.02 0.08 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.41 -0.26 -0.28 
 -4.29** -0.31 1.20 2.21* 0.56 2.48* 7.02** -4.18** -4.44** 
RETAIN 0.37 0.15 0.13 -0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.09 -0.36 -0.18 
 6.17** 2.40* 2.02* -0.23 -0.58 -1.82 -1.35 -5.89** -2.78* 
DELAY 0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.24 0.23 0.18 
 0.58 -0.42 0.23 -0.79 -0.55 0.65 -3.88** 3.69** 2.83* 
UWRITER -0.20 -0.13 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.20 -0.10 -0.18 
 -3.17** -1.99* 0.43 1.10 1.33 1.25 3.14** -1.52 -2.78* 
AUDQUAL -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.08 -0.16 -0.11 
 -0.14 0.73 0.47 0.15 -0.22 -1.04 1.26 -2.50* -1.77 
SALES (prospectus) -0.13 -0.10 0.23 0.08 0.08 -0.10 0.42 -0.52 -0.24 
 -2.05* -1.60 3.59** 1.26 1.20 -1.49 7.26** -9.29** -3.81** 
LIAB/TA (prospectus) -0.19 -0.20 0.23 0.08 -0.07 -0.16 0.46 -0.49 -0.20 
 -2.98** -3.18** 3.65** 1.26 -1.02 -2.58* 7.92** -8.63** -3.08** 
RETAIN/TA (prospectus) -0.16 -0.08 -0.02 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.40 -0.28 -0.18 
 -2.44* -1.19 -0.38 1.86 1.34 0.47 6.69** -4.54** -2.87** 
NI/TA (historical) -0.35 -0.14 0.15 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.50 -0.19 -0.24 
 -5.76** -2.27* 2.41* 1.10 -0.24 -0.20 8.99** -2.98** -3.87** 
GW/TA (prospectus) -0.08 -0.09 0.22 0.17 0.00 -0.02 0.24 -0.33 -0.14 
 -1.19 -1.47 3.55** 2.70* -0.02 -0.27 3.81** -5.45** -2.14* 
RD/TA (prospectus) 0.26 0.12 -0.14 0.06 0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.17 -0.03 
 4.22** 1.85 -2.24* 0.89 0.63 0.63 -0.75 -2.64* -0.40 
IIA/TA (prospectus) 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.06 0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.35 -0.13 
 2.38* 2.76* 2.43* 0.99 0.91 0.15 -0.65 -5.85** -1.95 
EXTRACT/TA (prospectus) -0.26 -0.17 -0.17 -0.04 -0.02 -0.09 -0.25 0.83 0.22 
 -4.24** -2.70* -2.65* -0.68 -0.28 -1.35 -4.05** 22.97** 3.47** 
PPE/TA (prospectus) -0.13 -0.11 0.20 0.15 0.13 -0.14 0.26 -0.38 -0.06 
 -2.06* -1.70 3.07** 2.27* 2.10* -2.23* 4.15** -6.40** -0.86 
IPlist 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.14 -0.36 -0.05 
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SPEARMAN’S RHO USE_WC USE_RD USE_REPAY USE_ACQUIRE USE_CAPEX USE_INVEST USE_CASHOUT USE_EXPLORE BACKDOOR 
 1.43 2.39* 1.90 0.24 0.17 0.16 2.24* -5.98** -0.74 
IPpost -0.02 0.18 -0.02 0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.20 -0.27 0.02 
 -0.33 2.85** -0.25 0.82 1.78 -0.32 3.17** -4.28** 0.29 
PATAPPLIC 0.03 0.34 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.15 0.02 
 0.52 5.52** 0.29 0.17 0.91 0.49 0.21 -2.38* 0.30 
PATENT 0.03 0.27 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.13 0.09 
 0.53 4.36** 0.74 0.03 0.86 0.59 0.12 -2.08* 1.39 
TRADEMARK 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.13 -0.34 -0.10 
 1.11 1.62 1.57 0.72 -0.11 0.40 1.98* -5.56** -1.55 
DESIGN -0.10 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.08 -0.07 0.07 
 -1.51 0.95 1.05 0.37 1.24 -0.32 1.22 -1.05 1.13 
UND 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.07 -0.01 -0.07 0.14 -0.26 -0.11 
 1.01 1.85 0.02 1.03 -0.21 -1.12 2.19* -4.09** -1.62 
NI/TA (7yr aver. post list) -0.39 -0.17 0.14 0.06 -0.10 0.08 0.33 -0.13 -0.26 
 -6.38** -2.59* 2.05* 0.84 -1.45 1.23 5.24** -1.98* -3.96** 
TOTDESIGN 0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.02 0.12 0.08 
 0.62 -1.47 -0.20 -0.15 1.39 -0.19 -0.23 1.83 1.22 
TOTPAT 0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.10 -0.07 -0.08 
 0.61 0.77 -0.58 1.56 2.19* 2.02* 1.46 -1.11 -1.23 
TOTTRADEMARK 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.30 0.23 0.10 0.35 0.17 -0.01 
 1.73 0.78 1.73 4.78** 3.55** 1.54 5.49** 2.61* -0.10 
IP_YR1 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.18 0.08 0.10 0.15 -0.04 -0.11 
 1.41 1.00 -0.04 2.88** 1.23 1.52 2.25* -0.66 -1.68 
IP_YR2 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.22 0.23 0.10 0.24 0.02 -0.07 
 0.01 1.25 0.35 3.51** 3.60** 1.53 3.70** 0.36 -1.02 
IP_YR3 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.21 0.25 0.12 0.18 0.05 0.05 
 0.20 0.69 0.26 3.31** 3.84** 1.79 2.65* 0.77 0.76 
IP_YR4 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.20 0.22 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.12 
 -0.44 -0.16 -0.47 3.10** 3.45** 1.54 1.07 1.66 1.80 
IP_YR5 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.00 
 -0.23 -0.57 -0.24 1.56 2.18* 1.61 1.11 0.08 -0.07 
 
TABLE 4  UNDERPRICING HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
 OLS Regressions of underpricing (UND) on “proposed use of proceeds”, capitalized intangibles, IP, and other firm characteristics 










































































































































































































































































































































































 OLS Regressions of underpricing (UND) on “proposed use of proceeds”, capitalized intangibles, IP, and other firm characteristics 



















































































































0.19 0.20 0.37 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 
OLS regressions with continuous “USE of proceeds” independent variables deflated by the total proposed issue of proceeds. OLS standard errors are White (1980) adjusted and 
Huber-White adjusted for the Probit parameters. One tailed significance test statistics are reported where a sign is predicted otherwise the tests are two tailed: ** denotes less then 1 
percent and * denotes less than 5 percent. The sample comprises IPOs listing between 1994 and 2000. Firm number is approximately 241. Variables are described in Table 1.  
 
UNDi,t =χ0 +χ1LOG(Age)i,t + χ2BACKDOORi,t + χ3LOG(Offer)i,t + χ4RETAINi,t + χ5DELAYi,t + χ6PIPOi,t+χ7HOTi,t+χ8UWRITERi,t + χ9AUDQUALi,t  + χ10FORECASTi,t + 
χ11USE_WCi,t + χ12USE_RDi,t + χ13USE_Explorei,t +χ14USE_Repayi,t + χ15USE_Capexi,t + χ16USE_Acquirei,t + χ17USE_Investi,t+χ18USE_Cashouti,t  +χ19CAPi,t +χ20IPlisti,t + 
+χ21(CAPi,t*IPlisti,t)+χ22(USEj,i,t*CAPi,t)+ χ23(USEj,i,t*IPlisti,t) +χ24(USEj,i,t*CAPi,t*IPlisti,t) + εi,t         (1) 
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TABLE 5  UNDERPRICING TESTS INCLUDING DISAGGREGATED INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 OLS Regressions of underpricing (UND) on individual “proposed use of proceeds”, disaggregated capitalized intangibles and IP 
   USE_WC USE_RD USE_Explore USE_Repay USE_Capex USE_Acquire USE_Invest USE_Cashout BACKDOOR 
BACKDOOR          -0.115 
-0.76 
USE_WC  -1.042 
-2.02* 
        
USE_RD   1.670 
6.03** 
       
USE_Explore    -0.294 
-0.90 
      
USE_Repay     -0.252 
-1.89 
     
USE_Capex      -0.116 
-0.69 
    
USE_Acquire       0.789 
4.62** 
   
USE_Invest        -0.251 
-0.78 
  
USE_Cashout         0.501 
3.45** 
 



































































































































































 OLS Regressions of underpricing (UND) on individual “proposed use of proceeds”, disaggregated capitalized intangibles and IP 
   USE_WC USE_RD USE_Explore USE_Repay USE_Capex USE_Acquire USE_Invest USE_Cashout BACKDOOR 






































































































































































































































































































 0.12 0.25 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.15 
 56
OLS regressions with binary “USE of proceeds” independent variables. One tailed significance test statistics are reported where a sign is predicted otherwise the tests are two tailed: 
** denotes less then 1 percent and * denotes less than 5 percent. The sample comprises IPOs listing between 1994 and 2000. Firm number is approximately 241. Variables are 
described in Table 1.  
 
UNDi,t =χ0 +χ1BACKDOORi,t +χ2USEj,i,t+χ3LOG(Age)i,t + χ4LOG(Offer)i,t + χ5RETAINi,t + χ6DELAYi,t + χ7PIPOi,t+χ8HOTi,t+χ9UWRITERi,t + χ10AUDQUALi,t  + χ11CAP_GWi,t 
+ χ12CAP_RDi,t + χ13CAP_IIAi,t + χ14CAP_EXTRACTi,t +χ15Patapplici,t + χ16Patenti,t + χ17Trademarki,t + χ18Designi,t+χ19IPposti,t +χ20(USEj,i,t*CAP_GWi,t) +χ21(USEj,i,t*CAP_RDi,t) 
+ χ22(USEj,i,t*CAP_IIAi,t)+ χ23(USEj,i,t*CAP_EXTRACTi,t)+ χ24(USEj,i,t*Patapplici,t) + χ25(USEj,i,t*Patenti,t) + χ26(USEj,i,t*Trademarki,t) + χ27(USEj,i,t*Designi,t) + εi,t            (2) 
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TABLE 6 POST-LISTING OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
   NI/TAt + 1 
(n= 1093) 
NI/TAt + 2 
(n= 854) 
NI/TAt + 3 
(n= 652) 
NI/TAt + 4 
(n= 468) 
NI/TAt + 5 
(n= 292) 
NI/TAt + 6 
(n= 190) 
NI/TAt + 7 
(n= 110) 
  



































































































































































































































 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.03 -0.06   
OLS regressions with continuous “USE of proceeds” independent variables. One tailed significance test statistics are reported where a sign is predicted otherwise the tests are two 
tailed: ** denotes less then 1 percent and * denotes less than 5 percent. The sample comprises IPOs listing between 1994 and 2000. Variables are described in Table 1.  
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TABLE 7 OPERATING PERFORMANCE TESTS FOR DISAGGREGATED INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
OLS Regressions of NI/TA averaged for seven years on individual “proposed use of proceeds”, disaggregated capitalized intangibles and IP 
   USE_WC USE_RD USE_Explore USE_Repay USE_Capex USE_Acquire USE_Invest USE_Cashout BACKDOOR 




































      
USE_Repay 0.020 
0.26 
   
0.326 
2.62** 
     
USE_Capex -0.238 
-1.70 
    
0.045 
0.21 
    
USE_Acquire 0.051 
0.55 
     
0.509 
1.34 
   
USE_Invest 0.194 
1.51 
















































































































































































OLS Regressions of NI/TA averaged for seven years on individual “proposed use of proceeds”, disaggregated capitalized intangibles and IP 































































































































































































0.09 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.09 
OLS regressions with continuous “USE of proceeds” independent variables deflated by the total proposed issue of proceeds One tailed significance test statistics are reported where a 
sign is predicted otherwise the tests are two tailed: ** denotes less then 1 percent and * denotes less than 5 percent. The sample comprises IPOs listing between 1994 and 2000. 
Variables are described in Table 1.  
 60
TABLE 8 POST-LISTING MARKET PERFORMANCE 
Dependent variable is Log(MVE/TA) 






 (n= 853) 
t+3 
 (n= 651) 
t+4 
 (n= 403) 
t+5 
 (n= 292) 
t+6 
 (n= 190) 
t+7 
 (n= 109) 
 

























































































































































































































































































































 (n= 853) 
t+3 
 (n= 651) 
t+4 
 (n= 403) 
t+5 
 (n= 292) 
t+6 
 (n= 190) 
t+7 
 (n= 109) 
 












































































































 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.31 0.25  
OLS regressions with continuous “USE of proceeds” independent variables deflated by the total proposed issue of proceeds. One tailed significance test statistics are reported where 
a sign is predicted otherwise the tests are two tailed: ** denotes less then 1 percent and * denotes less than 5 percent. The sample comprises IPOs listing between 1994 and 2000. 
Variables are described in Table 1.  
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TABLE 9  MARKET PERFORMANCE TESTS FOR DISAGGREGATED INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
OLS Regressions of  log(MVE/TA) averaged for seven years on individual “proposed use of proceeds”, disaggregated capitalized intangibles and IP 
   USE_WC USE_RD USE_Explore USE_Repay USE_Capex USE_Acquire USE_Invest USE_Cashout BACKDOOR 




































USE_WC  -0.071 
-0.59 
        
USE_RD   2.895 
2.19* 
       
USE_Explore    -0.129 
-0.36 
      
USE_Repay     -0.447 
-2.53* 
     
USE_Capex      -0.337 
-1.10 
    
USE_Acquire       -0.196 
-0.36 
   
USE_Invest        -0.330 
-1.53 
  
USE_Cashout         0.101 
0.55 
 
BACKDOOR          -0.296 
-2.61** 































































































































OLS Regressions of  log(MVE/TA) averaged for seven years on individual “proposed use of proceeds”, disaggregated capitalized intangibles and IP 
   USE_WC USE_RD USE_Explore USE_Repay USE_Capex USE_Acquire USE_Invest USE_Cashout BACKDOOR 













































































































































































































 0.11 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.13 
OLS regressions with continuous “USE of proceeds” independent variables deflated by the total proposed issue of proceeds One tailed significance test statistics are reported where a 
sign is predicted otherwise the tests are two tailed: ** denotes less then 1 percent and * denotes less than 5 percent. The sample comprises IPOs listing between 1994 and 2000. 
Variables are described in Table 1.  
 
